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ADMIRALTY-MARITIME LIENS--PRIORITY BETWEEN MARITIME LIEN AND
FEDRA TAx LI N.-Certain shipowners became delinquent in federal in-
come tax payments. Subsequently the petitioners furnished the ships with
materials and supplies. Thereafter, the United States levied liens on the
vessels for the taxes. Later the petitioners filed libels for maritime lions.
The United States moved to dismiss the petitions. Held, that the mari-
time liens took priority over the tax liens and that the motion to dismiss
be denied. The River Queen, The Dispatch II, The Eva Leigh (1925, E.
D. Va.) 8 Fed. (2d) 426.
Debts owing to the United States have priority over unsecured claims
of other creditors in the distribution of an insolvent estate. 6 U. S.
Comp. Sts. 1916, sec. 6372. This priority is said to depend exclusively on
statute. See United States v. Oklahoma (1923) 261 U. S. 253, 259, 43
Sup. Ct. 295, 297. United States tax claims, on the ground that they
stand on a higher plane (either that of parens patriae or "an exaction
imposed by the sovereign for his own purposes of an importance para-
mount to the rights of an individual") have been awarded like priority,
although, not within any statute. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Johnson Ship-
yards Corp. (1925, C. C. A. 2d) 6 Fed. (2d) 752 (equity receivership suit);
see Blair, The Priorty of the United States in Equity Receiverships (1925)
39 HAnv. L. REv. 1, 17. A United States tax lien has been awarded prior-
ity under Comp. Sts. sec. 6372, supra, over a prior ship mortgage regis-
tered under the Ship Mortgage Act of 1920 (2 U. S. Comp. Sts. Ann.
Supp. 1923, sees. 8146 4jjj-t). The Melissa Trask (1923, D. Mass.) 285 Fed.
781. This decision has been adversely criticised as unwarrantedly constru-
ing a priority in the distribution of insolvent estates into a priority of tax
liens over other secured claims. Fridlund, Federal Taxes and Preferred
Ship Mortgages (1925) 38 HARV. L. Ruv. 1060. Maritime lions are uni-
formly given preference over secured claims of other kinds prior and
subsequent. Phillips v. The Scattergood (1828, E. D. Pa.) 19 Fed. Cas.
No. 11106 (execution lien); The Favorite (1875, D. Or.) 8 Fed. Cas. No.
4699 (subsequent mortgage); The Native (1876, S. D. N. Y.) 17 Fed. Cas.
No. 10054 (express pledge); The J. E. Rumbell (1893) 148 U. S. 1, 13 Sup.
Ct. 498 (prior mortgage). Accordingly they have taken priority over
United States execution liens. Conard v. Atlantic Ins. Co. (1828, U. S,)
1 *Pet. 386. And over United States forfeitures which relate back to the
time of the wrongful act. The St. Jago de Cuba (1824, U. S.) 9 Wheat.
409 (wrongful act subsequent to facts creating lien) ; North Am. Coin. Go.
v. United States (1897, C. C. A. 9th) 81 Fed. 748 (wrongful act prior to
facts creating lien). Before the instant case there seems to have been
no decision as to the relative priority of maritime and United Sates tax
liens. In The Melissa Tras-, supra, the United States conceded the prior-
ity of the supplyman's lien over the tax lien. A United States tax lien
dates "from the time when the assessment list was received by the col-
lector. . . . Provided, however, that such lien shall not be valid as
against any mortgagee, purchaser, or judgment creditor until notice shall
be filed" as specified. 6 U. S. Comp. Sts. 1916, sec. 5908. This section
was made a part of the Revenue Act of 1921 by sec. 1300. (2 U. S. Comp.
Sts. Ann. Supp. 1923, sec. 6371 4/5 b). Therefore, it was urged in the
instant case that since the tax liens attached before the acts were done
which created the maritime liens, the tax liens should have priority. Ad-
mittedly, this would have given them priority over a common law lien.
But the court seems sound in holding that the maritime liens should be
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preferred on account of the peculiar considerations which have uniformly
allowed maritime liens priority over other securities; e. g., the necessity
that the ship complete the voyage for the benefit of all concerned. Cf.
Beach, Relative Priority of Maritime Liens (1924) 33 YuLE LAW JouAnI,
841.
ADmIRALTY-SUITS IN AnDiRLTY .AcT-ACTION IN PF .SONuI AGIuST
THE UNTnm STATEs.-The libellants brought suits against the United
States under the Suits in Admiralty Act, Act of Blar. 9, 1920 (41 Stat.
at L. 525) for failure to deliver their cargo which had been lost on a
government vessel. It was contended by the defendant that the purpose
of the act was to avoid seizures resulting from libels in ren against gov-
ernment-owned vessels, and hence a suit in pcrsonam where no lien
against the vessel existed, was not included. Held, that the libellants were
entitled to a decree against the United States. The Brtsh (Dec. 15, 1925,
D. Calif.) [1926] A. B1. C. 91.
It has been said that a sovereign cannot be sued, because there can be
no legal right against the authority which makes the law on which the
right depends. Kawanavakom v. Polybiankd (1907) 205 U. S. 349, 27 Sup.
Ct. 526. A sovereign may, however, be sued with its consent. Minncsota
-v. Hitchcock (1901) 185 U. S. 373, 22 Sup. CL 650. Consent was given to
suits in rent against government vessels by the Shipping Act, Act of Sept.
7, 1916 (39 Stat. at L. 728). The Lake Monroe (1919) 250 U. S. 246, 39
Sup. Ct. 460. But, as such remedy in r e caused delay to government
vessels through seizure under process, this Act was repealed by the Suits
in Admiralty Act providing for a libel in personam, against the Unit-d
States "where a proceeding in admiralty could be maintained." Clearly
an action in personam was substituted for an action in rcnt by the latter
Act. See 1 Benedict, Adiniralty (5th ed. 1925) 204, 269. And lihewise
in a case where either an action in rcnt or in pcrsonam could formerly
have been brought, the in rent action has now been abolished. Marhlc v.
United States (1925, S. D. Tex.) 8 Fed. (2d) 87. But where an action i,
personam alone existed before this Act, two views have emerged. Some
courts have sustained the contention of the defendant in the instant case.
Atlantic Fruit Co. v. United States (1923, S. D. N. Y.) 8 Fed. (2d) 81.
But others have reached the opposite result by looking to the apparent
legislative intent as shown by the history of the Act, and the use of the
clause "where a proceeding in admiralty could be maintained" instead of
the words in rent and in pcrsonam which were separately specified in the
original draft. Agros Corp. v. United States (1922, S. D. N. Y.) 8 Fed.
(2d) 84; see 1 Benedict, op. cit. 269. In following this view the instant
decision seems to reach a desirable result. A liberal tendency in the con-
struction of this act is evidenced by two recent Supreme Court decisions.
James Shewan & Sons v. United States (1924) 200 U. S. 103, 45 Sup. C.
45 (construction of "merchant vessel") ; Nahlach v. United States (1925)
267 U. S. 122, 45 Sup. Ct. 277 (jurisdiction extended to district where
libellant resides). Such constructions are to be favored. For a criticism
of the extension of government immunity from suits arising from its con-
duct of business, see (1923) 32 YALE LAW JourNAL, 839.
Bi Ls AND NoTES---INTERIBI CERTIFICATES NoT NE0Go m.m-The defend-
ant banker issued certificates entitling a holder to described bonds and
interest "when, as, and if" delivered to the banker. A provision recited
that taker and holder gave the maker power to treat any bearer as the
absolute owner. When the plaintiff, a bona fide purchaser, presented cer-
tificates to be exchanged for bonds, the defendant refused because of
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notice of theft from the original owner. On the issue of negotiability,
the court found for the defendant. The plaintiff appealed. Held, thAt the
judgment be affirmed, for the law merchant and trade usage cannot make
instruments negotiable against the express provisions of the N. I. L.-tho
stipulation that the maker night treat any bearer as absolute owner be-
ing an agreement for its protection. President and Directors of Man-
hattan Go. v. Morgan (1926) 242 N. Y. 38, 150 N. E. 594.
Irregular paper has been held negotiable by English courts, if so treated
in the market. Goodwin v. Robarts (1876, H. L.) L. R. 10 Exch. 337
(scrip certificate for foreign bonds); Rumball v. Metropolitan Bank
(1877) L. R. 2 Q. B. D. 194 (scrip certificates for private banking stock) ;
Webb, Hale & Co. v. Alexandria Water Co. Ltd. (1905, I. B.) 21 T. L. R.
572 (share warrant for stock). And this does not contravene the Bills of
Exchange Act. Chalmers, Bills of Exchange (8th ed., 1919) 328. But
the Negotiable Instruments Law specifically enumerates requirements of
negotiable instruments. N. 1. L. Sec. 1. Cf. Hunt v. Eure (1924) 188
N. C. 716, 125 S. E. 484. And it has been held in cases involving instru-
ments in most respects similar to those described in the N. I. L. that
the law merchant is without capacity to make paper negotiable contrary
to statute. King Cattle Co. v. Joseph (1924) 158 Minn. 481, 199 N. W.
437; (1924) 23 MIcn. L. Rav. 69; (1918) 6 CALIF. L. RE. 444; see In.
ternational Finance Co. v. Northwestern Drug Go. (1922, D. Minn.) 282
Fed. 920, 922. But even after adopting the N. L L. irregular instruments have
been given elements of negotiability by contract or estoppel, Union Trust
Co. of Rochester v. Oliver et al. (1915) 214 N. Y. 517, 108 N. E. 809;
(voting trust certificate of stock treated in financial circles as negotiable) ;
Aigler, Recognition of New Types of Negotiable Instruments (1924) 24
COL. L. Rav. 563; cf. Kelly v. Universal Oil Supply Co. (1924) 65 Calif.
App. 493, 224 Pac. 261 (irregular note and letter waiving defenses). Yet,
in other cases where negotiability seems equally desirable it has been
denied. American Nat. Bankc of San Francisco v. Sommervillo (1923) 191
Calif. 364, 216 Pac. 376 ("automobile paper"); COMMENTS (1923) 33 YALE
LAw JoURNAL, 302; General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Garrard (1925,
Idaho) 238 Pac. 524. The court suggested in the instant case that the
remedy is by legislation amending the N. I. L. An amendment should not
be necessary, although, perhaps, legislation similar to the Uniform Stock
Transfer Act would be desirable. Instruments which are quite dissimilar
to the types of instruments described in the N. I. L. might, as the court
intimated, well be considered as not being within its purview. Bills of
lading, prior to legislation codifying the case law development, were held
to possess elements of negotiability notwithstanding the N. 1. L. Pisapia
v. Hartford & N. Y. Transportation Co. (1909, Sup. Ct.) 62 =isc. 607,
116 N. Y. Supp. 26; Manufacturers' Comm. Co. v. Rochester Ry. (1911,
4th Dept.) 142 App. Div. 249, 126 N. Y. Supp. 1051. Moreover, on the
question of legislative intent, neither the Uniform Bills of Lading Act
nor the statutes relative to the negotiability of warehouse receipts and
stock certificates purport to be amendments to the N. L L. Hence, al-
though a bill of lading and an interim certificate differ in that the one
contemplates the delivery of goods, and the other the delivery of securi.
ties, it is submitted that the two are sufficiently alike in their failure to
meet the requirements of the N. I. L. that the latter (as well as the
former) could be given elements of negotiability without contravening the
N. I. L.
CONFLICT OF LAws-CRIMINAL LAw-FALsa PRETENSES-PLACE WHERE
CRIME IS CoMMiTTEm.-The defendant, living in California, by false pre-
tenses induced the prosecutor, who lived in Utah, to telegraph money to
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the defendant. He received the money in California and was there ar-
rested. He waived ex-radition and was indicted in Utah for obtaining
money by false pretenses. He was convicted by the lower court and ap-
pealed. Held, (one judge dissenting) that the judgment be affirmed since
the offense was committed in Utah. State v. Derot (1925, Utah) 242 Pac.
395.
Obtaining property by false pretenses is punishable in the state in which
the property was "obtained". It has thus been held punishable in the
state in which the property was received. Stcwart v. Jcs"n p (1S75) 51
Ind. 413; Owen vo. State (1923, Okla. Crim. App.) 211 Pac. 1059. But
where goods are sent by the defrauded party in state A by common car-
rier to the defendant in state B, it is generally held, on analogy to the
pasing of property in the law of sales, that the goods were "obtaine"
in state A. In re Stephenson (1S03) 67 Kan. 556, 73 Pac. 02; Statc v.
Lichliter (1S88) 95 Mo. 402, 8 S. W. 720. The state from which checks- or
money are sent through the mails is likewise held to be the state where
they were "obtained". Commonwealth v. Wood (1386) 142 Mass. 459, 8
N. E. 432; State v. Briggs (1906) 74 Kan. 377, 36 Pac. 447; but cf. State
v. Smith (1913) 162 Iowa, 336, 144 N. W. 32; Bates v. State (1905) 124
Wis. 612, 103 N. W. 251 (money held obtained in state where money re-
ceived). But courts apparently will not consider the crime completed if the
goods or the money are stopped in transit before reaching the fraudulent
party. Cf. Ex parte Parker (1881) 11 Neb. 309; see Bates z. State, -upra,
at 617, 103 N. W. at 253. While it is not difficult to consider the railroad
or the mail as an instrumentality through which a defendant obtains spe-
cific money, it cannot be said that the defendant in the instant case "ob-
tained money" in Utah, within the above definition, when in fact he actually
received in California entirely different money from that which was sur-
rendered by the prosecutor to the telegraph company in Utah. However,
since the object of a false pretense statute is to punish the defrauder, the
new meaning given the words "obtaining money" in the instant case ceems
proper in this new situation. Cf. Dewey, Com-porate Legal Pcronality
(1926) 35 YAL LAw JOURNAL, 655, 656. Its effect is to emphasize the
criminal aspect of fraudulently causing another to relinquish property,
rather than that of actually receiving the property. Cf. Clark: v. State
(1916) 14 Ala. App. 633, 72 So. 291 (money is obtained by false pretense3
although received by a third party). The decision is unfortunate, only if
it means that the crime could not be punished in Utah if the situation of
the instant case were reversed as to locality of the acts, and the defendant
was to receive in Utah money which was telegraphed from California.
Such would not seem to be the necessary result under the common law.
See 2 Wharton, Criinal Law (11th ed. 1912) see. 1473. And the diffi-
culty is entirely removed by statutes providing that a crime may be pun-
ished if part of it was committed within the state. N. Y. Penal Law,
1909, sec. 1930 (1); Calif. Penal Code, 1923, sec. 27 (1); see NoTES (1920)
26 COL. L. Ruv. 70.
CONFLICT OF LAWs--LTERARY PROPETY-INTERNATIONAL COPYIGHT,-
INFRINGEMENT OF ComizoN LAW PROTECTION OP UNPUBLSHED DRAmArIC
WoRxcPlaintiff, a British subject, brought an action to recover damage3
for infringement in New York of his common law right in a dramatic
production written by him in England. Common law rights in unpublished
works are expressly reserved to the author by the Copyright Act of
March 4, 1909, ch. 320 (35 Stat. at L. 1075). Because common lax "copy-
right" in Great Britain is abolished by the Copyright Act of 1911 (1 &
2 Geo. V, ch. 46, sec. 31) the defendant claimed that the plaintiff had no
YALE LAW JOURNAL
standing in court. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, and the
defendant moved that the verdict be set aside. Held, that the motion be
denied. Roberts v. Petrova (1925, Sup. Ct. N. Y. Co.) 126 Misc. 86, 213
N. Y. Supp. 434.
The court in the instant case seems to have considered that the right
of protection is created by the law of Great Britain, and that the Copyright
Act of 1911 does not affect the enforceability of this right in foreign
jurisdictions. It is said in an earlier New York case decided prior to the
British Act of 1911 which allowed recovery by a British author at a time
when both Great Britain and New York gave protection at common law,
that if the right was created solely by statute, it might be otherwise, as
the statutes could have no extra territorial force. See Palmer V. DeWitt
(1872) 47 N. Y. 532, 538. Applying the view expressed in the above
dictum, a result contrary to the instant decision would be reached. It
would seem, however, that protection would really be given a right created
by the law of New York. See Cook, Logical and Legal Bases of the Con-
flict of Laws (1924) 33 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 457. This result is supported
by decisions. Ferris v. Frohman (1912) 223 U. S. 424, 32 Sup. Ct. 263
(where performance in Great Britain amounting to publication under a
British statute was held not such a publication as to affect the common
law protection afforded the British author in the United States) ; "Morocco
Bound" Syndicate, Ltd. v. Harris (1895) L. R. 1 Ch. 534 (jurisdiction de-
clined because infringement in Germany was not a violation of a British
right). Unpublished works should be protected by each nation regardless
of authorship. Bar, Private International Law (Gillespie's Tr. 2d ed. 1892)
sec. 349 (because of potential connection with the territory of each nation,
rather than actual connection with an alien author). An interesting ques-
tion is presented in the British protection of unpublished works of Ameri-
can authors under the British Copyright Act of 1911. By Order in Council
issued under authority of this statute, American unpublished works are
protected. Mr. Balfour, Secretary of State, to Mr. Page, Ambassador
of the United States, May 17, 1918; Copyright Office Bull. No. 14 (1922)
55. But "the enjoyment of rights conferred by this order shall be subject
to the accomplishments of the conditions and formalities prescribed by the
law of the United States of America." 1 Statutory Rules and Orders
(1915) 54, sec. 1 (ii). What is "the law of the United States"? The Copy-
right Act of 1909, sec. 2, expressly reserves common law rights in un-
published works. And section 11 of the Act, concerning works not repro-
duced for sale, seems, according to the view evidently taken by the Copy-
right Office, to permit statutory protection by registration of unpublished
works. Copyright Office Bull. No. 14 (1922) 11, see. 11, marginal note.
But the construction of this section is debated. See Weil, Copyright Law
(1917) 289 et seq. While both sections announce "the law of the United
States" it may be readily supposed that the British order intended registra-
tion under sec. 11, as the prescribed condition and formality, It would
seem preferable, however, that, if protected at common law in the United
States, the unpublished work should be afforded protection under the
British Copyright Act without registration by American authors under
sec. 11. Proposed changes in the present American Copyright Law, strongly
urged, would clarify the matter by making registration optional. See Sol-
berg, Copyright Law Reform (1925) 35 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 48. See also
(1926) 35 YAmE LAW JOURNAL, 520; (1926) 26 COL. L. Rnv. 504.
CONTRAcTS--ASSIGNMENT-ASSIGNEE;'S WAIVER OF A CONDITION-
DIscHARGE OF ASSIGNOR-The plaintiff agreed to build truck frames for
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the defendant, delivery to be made monthly within a specified time. Plain-
tiff repeatedly failed to perform on schedule. In May, 1920, the defendant
assigned its business. The plaintiff assented to the assignment without
discharging the defendant. In August the assignee requested the plaintiff
to delay performance; and in October the former cancelled the unfulfilled
part of the contract. The plaintiff sued the assignor to recover for lo-s
sustained. :From a judgment for the plaintiff, the defendant appealed.
Held, that the judgment be reversed and a new trial granted, on the
ground that the assignee had no power to waive the condition of perform-
ance on time by the plaintiff. Parish Mfg. Co. v. Martin-Pa;r4 7j Corp.
(1926, Pa.) 131 AtI. 710.
The assignor of an executory bilateral contract can divest himself of all
his rights and cause similar ones to arise in favor of the assignee. Tol-
hurst v. Associated Mfg. Co. [1903] A. C. 414. He cannot assign his
duties; but he can delegate their performance to the assignee if ouch per-
formance is not "personal". See Crane Ice Crcam Co. v. Tcrminzal Freez-
ing Co. (1925, Md.) 128 At. 280, 283 (contract to supply on credit ice
needed in assignor's business held not enforceable by assignee). An as-
signment in general terms usually carries with it by implication an agree-
ment by the assignee that he will perform these delegated duties. Cor-
vallis & A. Ry. v. Portland E. & E. Ry. (1917) 84 Or. 524, 163 Pac. 1173.
The assignor remains bound to the other contracting party for the full
performance of his promise. This obligation has many of the elements
of suretyship; for instance, it has been held that the contract between
the assignor and the assignee makes the latter primarily responsible to
pay for goods delivered. Atlantic & N. C. Ry. v. Atlantic & N. C. Co.
(1908) 147 N. C. 368, 61 S. E. 185; (1921) 21 COL. L. REv. 393. A mate-
rial change or modification of the original contract, agreed upon by the
assignee and the other contracting party without the consent of the as-
signor, would effect a discharge of the assignor who was bound as surety
only to the extent of his original agreement with the third party. Litch-
field v. Garratt (1862) 10 Mich. 426; cf. Millcr v. Stcwart (1824, U. S.)
9 Wheat. 680. Thus, a binding extension of time given by the plaintiff
to the assignee discharges the assignor. Union, Life In-s. Co. v. Hanford
(1892) 143 U. S. 187, 12 Sup. Ct. 437. The instant case, however, does not
come within the surety analogy because no extension was granted the
assignee. Before the assignment, the assignor's duty was probably con-
ditional upon prompt performance by the plaintiff. Arorr nton -e. Wright
(1885) 115 U. S. 188, 6 Sup. Ct. 12. This was not changed by reason of
the assignment. See Rochester Lantern Co. v. Stiles & Parher Pres
(1892) 135 N. Y. 209, 216, 31 N. E. 1018, 102L The lateness of the plain-
tiff's performance amounted to a substantial failure of consideration such
as to discharge the assignor from his duty. The assignor in the instant
case did not waive this condition, nor did he authorize the assignee to
waive it for him. It is submitted that although an assignment of a bi-
lateral contract may create a power in the assignee to discharge the as-
signor's duty, it does not include a power to make that duty more burden-
some by waiving conditions and defenses of the assignor, and hence the
instant case seems sound.
CoRPorkTIONs-LICENSES-STOCK SALES IN VIOLATION OF BLuE SxY
LAW NOT Vo.-The plaintiff corporation having sold stock in violation
of the Ohio "Blue Sky Law" sued for the unpaid balance of the purchase
price. The lower court rendered judgment for the defendant on the ground
that the sale was void. The plaintiff appealed. Held, that the intention
of the legislature was not to make void sales of stock in violation of the
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statute, but to punish its violation under penalty. The judgment was
affirmed, however, because of improper service on the defendant. Warren
People's Market Co. v. Corbett & Sons (1926, Ohio) 151 N. E. 51.
To guard against the evils growing out of the marketing of stocks and
bonds at fictitious valuations "Blue Sky Laws" have been enacted in many
states. Elliott, Blue Sky Laws (1919) passim; see Standard Home Co. v.
Davis (1914, E. D. Ark.) 217 Fed. 904, 919. And they have been hold
constitutional as a proper exercise of the police power to protect citizens
against fraud. Caldwell v. Sioux Falls Stock Yards Co. (1917) 242 U. S.
559, 37 Sup. Ct. 224 (S. D. Statute); MerricI v. Halsey & Co. (191) 242
U. S. 568, 37 Sup. Ct. 227 (Mich. Statute); Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co. (1917)
242 U. S. 539, 37 Sup. Ct. 217 (Ohio statute). Premised upon this inter-
pretation, most courts have held void a sale of stock by a corporation which
has not complied with the "Blue Sky Law". Farm Products Co. of Michigan
v. Jordan (1924) 229 Mich. 235, 201 N. W. 198; Reno v. American lee
Machine Co. (1925, Calif.) 237 Pac. 784; Biddle v. Smith (1923) 148 Tenn.
489, 256 S. W. 453. For example: A corporation could not recover on a
stock subscription. Witt v. Trustees' Loan & Savings Co. (1925) 33 Ga.
App. 802, 127 S. E. 810. Nor on notes given in payment for such stoel.
Farm Products Co. of Michigan v. Jordan, supra; Reilly v. Clyne (1925,
Ariz.) 234 Pac. 35 (purchaser not estopped to deny validity of considera-
tion for note). And courts have allowed a defendant so being0 sued on his
notes to recover on a counterclaim for prior payments. Guaranty Mortgage
Co. v. Wilcox (1923) 62 Utah 184, 218 Pac. 133. Or to sue independently
to recover payments made. Landwehr v. Lingenfelder (1923, Mo. App.)
249 S. W. 723; Edward v. loor (1919) 205 Mich. 617, 172 N. W. 620. In
the instant case the court interprets its "Blue Sky Law" according to the
supposed intention of its legislature, rather than with an eye to the prevail-
ing view of public policy. This construction has the support of Watters
& Martin v. Homes Corp. (1923) 136 Va. 114, 116 S. E. 366 (recognizing
that the general rule is contra). In so holding, however, the court in the
instant case seems to have relied principally on the authority of Vermont
Loan & Trust Co. v. Hoffman (1897) 5 Idaho, 376, 49 Pac. 314, and Smoot
v. Perkins, (1917, Tex. Civ. App.) 195 S. W. 988. The Texas case merely
decided that the defendant could not wait, until after the corporation be-
came bankrupt before denying his obligation on the stock. For a similar
holding, see In re Racine Auto Tire Co. (1923, C. C. A. 7th) 290 Fed. 939;
but cf. Goodyear v. Meux (1920) 143 Tenn. 287, 228 S. W. 57. And the
Idaho case recognized the general rule that an act in violation of a statute
forbidding it is void, but drew an exception when the statute is penal and
"for the protection of the public revenue". It seems, however, that merely
fining the corporation for violating the statute would not be so effective a
measure as would the prohibiting of recovery of the purchase price. This
seems to be the view taken by the latest Idaho decision construing a now
statute similar to that in the instant case. Ashley & Rumelin v. Brady
(1925, Idaho) 238 Pac. 314. It is submitted that the primary justification
•of these statutes is to protect the public 'against fraud. It appears that the
Ohio Court did not give this purpose its full weight. Hall v. Geiger-Jones
Co., supra; see David, What is Wrong With the Blue Sky Law (1926) 24
OHIO L. BULL. AND REP. 222; 3 Opinions Ohio Attorney General (1915)
2074.
CRIMINAL LAW-FALSE PRETENSES-SALE OF MORTGAGED GOODS WITHOUT
DIscLosURE OF MORTGAGE NOT CRIAIINAL.-The defendant sold as his own
to the prosecuting witness six bales of cotton on which there was an out-
standing mortgage. No express misrepresentations were made, however.
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The defendant was convicted of obtaining money by false pretenses, and
appealed. Held, that the judgment be reversed, on the ground that a
mere withholding of kmowledge will not constitute a false preten_e. Mc-
Carkle v. State (1926, Ark.) 278 S. W. 965.
The false pretense statutes were enacted to extend responsibility for
fraudulent conduct not culpable at common law. 2 Bishop, Criminal Lazw(9th ed. 1923) sec. 410. The typical statute punishes the obtaining of money
or property by means of an intentionally false representation of a past or
eanisting fact. See 2 Bishop, op. cit. secs. 413, 414; cf. Ark. Crawford and
Moses Sts. 1921, ch. 43, sec. 2449. Most courts hold that such a representa-
tion may be made by implication as well as by e-press language. Com-
monwealth v. Beckett (1905) 119 Ky. 817, 84 S. W. 758; ef. con!ra: People
v. Baker (1884) 96 N. Y. 340. It may be implied without words from mere
conduct. Regina,v . Goss (1860) 8 Cox. C. C. 262; 2 Wharton, C,-imnnal
Law (11th ed. 1912) sec. 1434. It should be enough that the idea is dis-
tinctly conveyed by words, conduct, or silence, or any combination thereof.
2 Bishop, op. cit. sec. 430. Thus the following acts have been held to con-
stitute the offense: Drawing a check on a bank where the drawer has
no funds and presenting it to a third person. State v. Ha~mmaeloy (1903)
52 Or. 156, 96 Pac. 865; Eaton v. State (1918) 16 Lla. App. 405, 78 So.
321. Silently uttering a counterfeit note. 2 Bishop, op. cit. see. 430; ef.
Canmonwealth v. Beckett, supra.. Selling worthless certificates. State v.
Bou re (1902) 86 Minn. 432, 90 N. W. 1103. Paying for goods with the
note of a third party that has been paid or partially paid. Regima v.
Davis (1859) 18 U. C. Q. B. 130. Selling a spurious ring as one of true
metal, not expressly representing it to be gold, but asking the price of a
gold ring. 2 Wharton, op. cit. at 1619. Thus the mere suppression of a
fact by the vendor may amount to a false pretense. The selling of the
goods in the instant case certainly conveyed the idea that they were free
from mortgage to the purchaser, for the latter apparently paid full value.
Cf. Sales Act, sec. 13 (3). It further appears that the defendant intended
to convey that idea, knowing it was false, since the jury convicted him. It
is submitted that the instant case reaches an unfortunate result in failing
to hold such conduct to be within the statute.
CRIhmINAL LAW-INSANITY-TEST OP INSANITY AT TinE or TnIAL.-The
defendant was convicted of murder and sentenced to be hanged. Sentence
was annulled by the Supreme Court, and the case remanded for the purpose
of ascertaining the sanity of the defendant at the time of trial or there-
after. The trial judge appointed a lunacy commission which found that
the defendant was thirty years of age, knew right from wrong and was
not insane although he was of a mental age of only seven or eight years.
The court thereupon re-sentenced him and he appealed. Held, (one judge
dissenting) that the conviction be affirmed on the ground that the evidence
did not show that the defendant was insane. State v. Brodcs (1926, La.)
107 So. 131.
At common law, and in most jurisdictions by statute, the accused cannot
be tried or punished when insane, even though he were sane at the time
of committing the crime. State v. Vann (1881) 84 N. C. 722; State v.
Reed (1889) 41 La. 581, 7 So. 132; (1918) 27 YALE L=uv Jounr ,, 693.
When testing the legal responsibility of the insane, the federal courts, as
well as about twenty state courts (including Louisiana), follow the criteria
of the "right and wrong" test as laid down in McHNazghtan's Case (1843,
P. C.) 10 Cl. & F. 200. Gcr~nan v. Uzited States (1908, C. C. A. 6th) 120
Fed. 666; (1916) 30 HAnv. L. Rnv. 179. This test was applied by the ma-jority of the court in the instant case. The problem before the court, how-
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ever, was not whether the defendant could distinguish between right and
wrong when he committed the alleged murder, but whether he was "insane"
at the time of the trial or at any time thereafter. A different test of sanity
is there used. Freeman v. People (1847, N. Y.) 4 Denio, 9. The general rule
seems to be that one incapable of properly appreciating his peril and of
rationally assisting in his own defense is so far of unsound mind that he
may not be tried, sentenced, or punished. Freeman v. People, supra;
Taffe v. State (1861) 23 Ark. 34 (by statute); State v. Reed, supra;
United States v. Lancaster (1877, C. C. N. D. Ill.) 7 Biss. 440; but of.
Re Schneider (1893) 21 D. C. 433 (holding that the defendant must be
wholly unconscious of his situation). It is held by the civil law, by common
law, and by statute that a child between the ages of seven and fourteen
is presumed to be incapable of criminal intent, but this may be overcome
by evidence. (1680) 1 Hale P. C. 26, 27; Garner v. State (1910) 97 Ark,
63, 132 S. W. 1010. It may be that the common law courts made no dis-
tinction between a child's capacity for committing the offense and
his capability of defending himself. Hence it would be possible to recon-
cile the decision of the court on this ground. The court, however, based
its decision on the defendant's ability to meet the "right and wrong" test.
A finding that the defendant at the time of trial could meet the "right and
wrong" test should raise no presumption that he was sane (for the purpose
of trial) under the test usually applied. The fact that the defendant would
not take advice from his attorney during trial tends to show that he
was not competent to make a rational defense. Taffe v. State, supra;
Guagando v. State (1874) 41 Tex. 626; *United States v. Lancaster, supra.
This was the view of the dissenting judge.
FORFEITURE-REPEAL OF ABSOLUTE FORFEITURE PROVISION IN REVENUE
LAW By PROHIBITION AcT.-The plaintiff brought forfeiture proceedings
against an automobile under U. S. Comp. Sts. 1916, sec. 6352 of the In.
ternal Revenue Law (U. S. Rev. Sts. 1873, sec. 3450) which provides,
inter alia, for the forfeiture of vehicles which are used to remove goods
on which there is an unpaid tax, with the intent to defraud the government.
The assignee of the mortgagee of the car intervened setting up that he
had no knowledge of the unlawful use of the car, and as sec. 26 of the Vol-
stead Act exempted the interests of innocent ovners and lienors from
forfeiture of vehicles seized while illegally transporting liquor, this action
was not maintainable under the old statute. The intervener prayed for
the return of the car or for the payment of the amount of its interest
out of the proceeds of the sale. Held, that the prayer be granted, as the
former statute is repealed by the Volstead Act in so far as the facts of
the instant case are' concerned. United States v. One Chevrolet Coupe
(1925, E. D. Mo.) 9 Fed. (2d) 85.
The courts seem to be in hopeless conflict as to whether the limited for-
feiture provision of the Volstead Act impliedly repeals the absolute for-
feiture provision of the Internal Revenue Law as to vehicles used for the
illegal transportation of liquor. Blakemore, Prohibition (2d ed. 1925)
535, et seq. Some of the early cases held that as the two statutes re-
ferred to different subject matters, and as the elements necessary to con-
viction under each were different, they were not inconsistent, and hence
the former was not repealed. United States v. One Essex Automobile
(1920, N. D. Ga.) 266 Fed. 138; United States w. One Cole Automobile
(1921, D. Mont.) 273 Fed. 934. Others held that as the act of remov-
ing the liquor was the same whichever statute was involved only the later
statute providing the lesser punishment was applicable. Lewis v. United
States (1922, C. C. A. 6th) 280 Fed. 5; United States v. One Haynes Auto.
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mbile (1921, C. C. A. 5th) 274 Fed. 926. Some reached the same recult
on the theory that there was no longer a specific tax on liquor. One Ford
Car v. United States (1922, C. C. A. Sth) 284 Fed. 823. The Supreme
Court held, largely in view of the milder penalties imposed by the Vol-
stead Act, that the penalties in the old tax laws were repealed as to liquor.
United States v. Yugihwvieh. (1921) 256 U. S. 450, 41 Sup. Ct. 551 (in-
volving old tax laws relating to distillers). In 1921, however, the Willis-
Campbell Act was passed, providing that the old laws in regard to the
manufacture, tax, and traffic of liquor and their penalties should still be
in force except as they were in direct conflict with the Volstead Act (42
Stat. at L. 222). The Supreme Court held that this statute abrogated the
rule in the Yugbtwvich case, supra. United States v. Stafoff (1923) 260
U. S. 477, 43 Sup. Ct. 197. But the forfeiture cases are still in the same
state of confusion as before the 1921 Act. McFadden, Prohibition (1925)
357, et seq. Some courts hold that although the old law was repealed by
the Volstead Act, it was re-enacted by the 1921 Act. United States v. One
Bay State Roadster (1924, D. Conn.) 2 Fed. (2d) 616; United State. v.
One Ford Auto (1924, W. D. Tenn.) 2 Fed. (2d) 882. Others maintain
that the old law is in direct conflict with the Volstead Act as far as the
forfeiture of vehicles seized while transporting liquor is concerned, and
hence is not saved by the 1921 Act. Commercial Credit Co. v. United
States (1925, C. C. A. 6th) 5 Fed. (2d) 1; United States v. Garth Motor
Co. (1925, C. C. A. 5th) 4 Fed. (2d) 528. Others have simply ignored
the 1921 Act, holding that the old law no longer applies. Unitcd State- v.
One Packard Truck (1922, E. D. Mich.) 284 Fed. 394. It seems probable
that the purpose of the 1921 act was to increase the penalties for the vio-
lation of the Volstead Act, among other things, by maling the violators
also liable for the taxes. It is submitted, however, that as Congreos in
the Volstead Act expressly manifested an intention to protect the inno-
cent owner and lienor, the object of this provision would have been nulli-
fied in the instant case if forfeiture proceedings had been held maintainable
under the old statute.
FUTURE INTEREsTS-DOWER-RIGHT To Dowrn IN AN ESTATE SUBJECT
TO AN EXECUTORY DEwsE.-The testator devised land to his wife, the will
providing that upon her death it should be divided up among the testator's
children (one of whom was defendant's husband), and if any child should
die without issue, his share was to be divided among the other children or
their lineal heirs. The testator's wife died and the land was divided ac-
cording to the will. Later the defendant's husband died without issue,
the defendant continuing in possession. In an action for the land by the
other children, the court held that the determination of the estate by
operation of the executory devise did not deprive the defendant of dower.
Held, that the judgment be affirmed. Alexander v. Fleming (1925, N. C.)
130 S. E. 867.
At common law, a widow entitled to dower had merely a power to call
on the heirs for assignment of her share. Before this was done she had
no freehold interest in the land. Williams, Real Propcrty (22d ed. 1914)
333; 2 Blackstone, Commentaries, *135. When an estate is granted on a
condition, the estate is not terminated after the condition is broen unleS3
an entry is made; and until such entry there remains an estate from which
dower can be assigned. Ellis v. Kyger (1886) 90 Mo. 600, 3 S. W. 23; 4
Kent, Commentaries (13th ed. 1884) 38. But in the case of a fee subject
to a conditional limitation, the estate terminates forthwith on the happen-
ing of the condition. It would seem to follow, therefore, that the termina-
tion of the estate should destroy dower, for no estate descends to the
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heirs out of which dower can be assigned. Edwards v. Bibb (1875) 54
Ala. 475; Park, Dower (Law Libr. ed. 1836) 84. And such was the view
at early common law, i.e. termination of the estate also cut off dower.
Text-writers since have been inclined the same way in regard to executory
devises. 1 Scribner, Dower (2d. ed. 1883) 315; Park, op. cit. 85. But the
common law courts favoring dower, later said that dower was implied in
che original grant, and thus created an exception which allowed dower in
fee simple estates which had escheated for want of heirs, and in fee tail
estates which had reverted for want of issue. Paines' Case (1588) 8 Coke,
"34a; Northeut v. Whipp (1851, Ky.) 12 B. Mon. 65; 2 Coke, Littleton
"241a; 2 Bright, Husband & Wife (1849) 467; 1 Washburn, Real Propcrty
(6th ed. 1902) sec. 445. However, where the husband's estate terminated
otherwise than by death (i.e. by recovery, condition, collateral limitation,
exercise of power of appointment), the common law courts applied the
earlier rule that the widow's dower was cut off by the termination of the
estate. Thompson v. Vance (1858, Ky.) 1 Met. 670 (power of appoint-
ment); Scribner, op. cit. 289-297. Later, in dealing with future estates
created by springing uses and executory devises which were dependent on
statutes, the courts, recognizing the hardship of such a rule, refused to
apply it and granted the widow dower despite the logical inconsistency in
so holding. Buckworth v. Thiykell (1785, K. B.) 3 Bos. & P. 652, note;
3foody v. King (1825, C. P.) 2 Bing. 447; Kales, Future Interests (1920)
sees. 451, 452; 3 Preston, Abstracts of Title (2d ed. 1824) 373. The instant
case, in following this view, is in accord with the majority of the cases on
this subject. Pollard v. Slaughter (1885) 92 N. C. 72; Mu7phy v. Murphy
(1919) 182 Ky. 731, 207 S. W. 491; Aloe v. Lowe (1917) 278 Il. 233, 115
N.- E. 862; Sheffield v. Cooke (1916) 39 R. I. 217, 98 Ati. 161; contra:
Edwards v. Bibb, supra; Hatfield v. Sneden (1864, N. Y.) 42 Barb. 615.
. INTERNATIONAL LAW-TERMINATION OF WAR-EFFECT OF POLITICAL
RECOGNITION OF Nmv STATE WITHIN ENEMY STATE--STATUS OF RESIDENTS
OF Nnw STATE As ALIEN ENEHES.-The plaintiffs sue under the Indiana
Workmen's Compensation Act (Ind. Acts, 1915, ch. 106, sec. 24), as de-
pendents of a deceased employee whose death occurred in September, 1917.
The plaintiffs were residents of a village located in what at the time of
decedent's death was the Austro-Hungarian Empire but at the time of
suit was the newly recognized Kingdom of the Serbs, Croatians and
Slovenes (Jugo-Slavia). Defense was the statute of limitations (two
years). Claim for compensation was filed in March, 1923, within two
years after the official termination of war with the Austro-Hungarian
Empire on July 2, 1921, but more than two years after the political recog-
nition of Jugo-Slavia. The lower court held that the action was not barred
by the statute of limitations. The defendant appealed. Held, that the
judgment be affirmed, since the suspension of the operation of the statute
of limitations as to alien enemies was not lifted until the terinination of
the war between the United States and the Austro-Hungarian Empire.
Inland Steel Co. v. Jelenovic (1926, Ind.) 150 N. E. 391.
At common law a non-resident alien enemy is incapacitated from in-
stituting or maintaining suits; but the statute of limitations is suspended
during the discontinuance of this disability. Hanger v. Abbott (1868, U. S.)
6 Wall. 532. The Trading with the Enemy Act created certain exceptions
to this common law rule, permitting suit by non-resident alien enemies
arising from transactions expressly licensed. Act of Oct. 6, 1917 (40
Stat. at L. 411). The instant case does not fall within the exceptions
created by this act, for the plaintiffs' cause of action arose before the
issue of the general license on July 14, 1919, to trade and communicate
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with non-resident alien enemies. Meares, Tradiag with, the Encwy Act
(1924) 548; Hu~ngarian General Crcditbazl: r. Tit s (1918, 1st Dept.) 182
App. Div. 826, 169 N. Y. Supp. 926; cf. Gardanicr v. Celadd. (1922) 24
Ariz. 185, 207 Pac. 875. Recognition by the political department of the
government is conclusive in all courts. Oetici z. Central Lcathcr Co.
(1918) 246 U. S. 297, 3S Sup. Ct. 309. The recognition by the State De-
partment of Jugo-Slavla expressly left to the Peace Conference the cettle-
ment of territorial frontiers. (Feb. 8, 1919) 3 Official Bulletin of U. S.
Committee on Public Information No. 533. This recognition did not change
the plaintiffs' status as alien enemies, for there was no determination that
they were -within the territory which Jugo-Slavia might acquire. Garmn
v. Diamwzd Coal and Coke Co. (1924) 278 Pa. 469, 1 3 AtI. 463; contra:
of. Waldes v. Basch (1919, Sup. Ct. Spec. T.) 109 Misc. 306, 179 N. Y. Supp.
713 (where plaintiff was a resident of the capital of the new state).
Austria-Hungary recognized the frontiers and confirmed the domain of
Jugo-Slavia by the treaty of St. Germain en Lays, signed September 10,
1919, and effective July 16, 1920. It would seem that this act on the part
of the parent state coupled with our previous recognition of the new state
should establish the plaintiffs' domicile as within the borders of a friendly
nation and thus give them the status of friendly aliens, no longer under -a
disability to sue in our courts. It would appear, therefore, that the statute
of limitations began to run with the removal of this disability and prior
to the technical termination of war between the United States and Austria-
Hungary, and that it should have been a bar to this action. Cf. Kolund-
iija v. Hanna, Mining Co. (1923) 155 Minn. 176, 193 N. W. 163; (1925) 34
YALE LAw JoURNAL, 432; contra: Zeliznih v. Lytle Coal Co. (1924) 82 Pa.
Super. Ct. 489; cf. Rootuli v. Alaska Gastincau Mining Co. (1923, C. C. A.
9th) 288 Fed. 549 (where notice within a given period is made a condition
precedent to the right to sue under a workanen's compensation statute).
JURY-QuALIFICATION OF WomN As JURons.-Plaintiff, a woman resi-
dent of Illinois and a legal voter in that state, petitioned for a writ of
mandamus against the county jury commissioners to compel them to place
her name upon the jury list. The jury statute of Illinois (Cahill's Ill.
Rev. Sts. 1923, ch. 78, sec. 26) provides that the jury commissioners "shall
prepare a list of all electors . . . possessing the necessary legal quali-
fications for jury duty to be known as the jury list." The lower court
gave judgment for the plaintiff, and the defendant appealed. Held, that
the judgment be reversed, since women, although now entitled to vote,
are not electors in the sense in which that word was understood and used
by the legislature at the time the statute was enacted. People z rel.
Fyfe v. Banmett (1926, Ill.) 150 N. E. 290.
The exclusion of women from jury lists presents a state and not a fed-
eral question, for-(1) It is not a denial of due process. Cf. Maxwell v.
Dow (1900) 176 U. S. 581, 20 Sup. Ct. 448;-(2) it is not a denial of the
equal protection of the laws. Cf. McKincy v. State (1892) 3 Wyo. 719,
30 Pac. 293;-(3) it is not prohibited by the Nineteenth Amendment, for
jury service is no part of suffrage. State v. James (1921) 96 N. J. L.
132, 114 Atl. 553. Nor can state legislation granting woman suffrage be
construed by implication to qualify women as jurors. In re Grill (1920,
Sup. Ct. Spec. T.) 110 Mlisc. 45, 179 N. Y. Supp. 795; Harper -. State
(1921) 90 Tex. Cr. R. 252, 234 S. W. 909. At common law women were
excluded from jury service. See Capital Traction Co. e. Hof (1899) 174
U. S. 1, 13, 19 Sup. Ct. 580, 585; 3 Blackstone, Commentarie3,* 362. But
statutes expressly authorizing women jurors have uniformly been upheld.
Ex parte Ma2a (1918) 178 Calif. 213, 172 Pac. 986; cf. In re Opiion of
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Justices (1921) 237 Mass. 591, 130 N. E. 685. In the instant case, how-
ever, the court was called upon to construe jury statutes adopted before
woman suffrage. Most of the decisions which have held women disquali-
fied for jury service can be distinguished in that the state constitutions
or statutes referred to jurors as "men." People v. Lensen (1917) 34
Calif. App. 336, 167 Pac. 406; State v. Kelley (1924) 39 Idaho, 668, 229
Pac. 659. In the absence of such provisions most courts have held that
women when they became electors ipso facto became qualified as jurors.
Parus v. District Court (1918) 42 Nev. 229, 174 Pac. 706; State v. Walker
(1921) 192 Iowa, 823, 185 N. W. 619; Commonwealth v. Maxwell (1921)
271 Pa. 378, 114 Atl. 825; People v. Barltz (1920) 212 Mich. 580, 180 N.
W. 423 (notwithstanding a constitutional provision relating to juries of
"men"); contra: In re Opinion of Justices, supra, (although the court says
that other changes in the statutory qualifications of electors have auto-
matically affected the jury list). It is doubtful, however, whether vomen
jurors fall within the purview of such statutes, for the right of women
to serve as jurors would ordinarily carry with it the duty to serve; and
the Illinois jury statute makes no provision for exemptions peculiarly
applicable to women. Cf. In re Opinion of Justices, supra. The Illinois
Court, it would seem, properly refused to permit such a radical change
to rest solely on statutory construction, but preferred to await a clear
legislative expression of the state public policy in regard to women jurors.
Cf. Harland v. Territory (1887) 3 Wash. T. 131, 13 Pac. 453; (1919) 4
A. L. R. 152, note. In some states, by statute, jury duty on the part of
women is compulsory; in others it is optional, and in others women are
expressly made ineligible. Miller, The Woman Juror (1922) 2 OREGON L.
Ray. 30,
LiTERARY PROPERTY-COPYRIGHT-TRADE MARKS-TITLE or COPYRIGHTED
LITERARY WORK PROTacTm.-Plaintiff wrote "The Ballad of Yukon Jake"
which was published during 1921-1923. He also prepared a scenario,
named "Yukon Jake, the Killer", based on the same plot. Defendant, in
1924, named a film "Yukon Jake", which film portrayed an entirely differ-
ent story, and distributed it, although advised by the plaintiff of the above
facts. The plaintiff brought this action for an injunction, an accounting,
and damages. Held, that judgment be given for the plaintiff. Paramore v.
Mack Sennett (1925, S. D. Calif.) 9 Fed. (2d) 66.
The only similarity betveen the defendant's and the plaintiff's works
is in the titles. It is usually said that a title is not the subject of copy-
right. Corbett v. 1 urdy (1897, C. C. S. D. N. Y.) 80 Fed. 901; Dioks V.
Yates (1881) L. R. 18 Ch. D. 76. But the title is protected in connection
with the substance of the work. Harper v. Ranous (1895, C. C. S. D. N. Y.)
67 Fed. 904; Savage v. Singer (1914, C. P.) 24 Pa. Dist. 482. If the work
then fails of protection, the title also fails, Jollie v. Jaques (1850, C. C.
S. D. N. Y.) 1 Blatch. 618; see Black v. Ehrich (1891, C. C. S. D. N. Y.)
44 Fed. 793, 794. When the copyright upon the work has expired, the title may
be used by anyone. Glaser v. St. Elmo Co. (1909, C. C. S. D. N. Y.) 175
Fed. 276; Merriam v. Famous Shoe Co. (1891, C. C. E. D. Mo.) 47 Fed. 411.
Titles may be protected in other ways: As registered trade marks. Cf.
Hopkins, Trade Marks, Trade Names, and Unfair Competition (4th ed.
1924) sec. 85 et. seq. Or, as common law trade marks. Social Registeii
Asso. v. Howard (1894, C. C. N. J.) 60 Fed. 270. The infringing work
must, however, ordinarily be of the same nature as the original, Cf.
Atlas Mfg. Co. v. Street (1913, C. C. A. 8th.) 204 Fed. 398; Estes v. Wil-
liams (1884, C. C. S. D. N. Y.) 21 Fed. 189; Munro v. Tousey (1891) 129
N. Y. 38, 29 N. E. 9. But there seems to be a tendency to give broader
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protection, on the ground of unfair competition, where there is reasonable
probability of injury to the plaintiff or to the public. Wall v. Rolls-Royce
(1925, C. C. A. 3d) 4 Fed. (2d) 333 (maker of radio tubes enjoined from
use of name of automobile manufacturers); Vogue Co. v. Thompson (1924,
C. C. A. 6th) 300 Fed. 509 (maker of hats enjoined from use of markr
similar to plaintiff's mark for fashion magazine); Fisher v,. Star Co. (1921)
231 N. Y. 414, 132 N. E. 133 (restraint of publication of cartoons designated
as "Mutt and Jeff"); Hopkins Amusement Co. v. Frohman (1903) 202 In.
541, 67 N. E. 391 (play "Sherlock Holmes, Detective" enjoined by producer
of "Sherlock Holmes" on ground of public deception). When the sole
similarity between stage plays and moving pictures has been in the title,
injunctions have been granted. Dickey v-. Mutual Film Corp. (1916, Spec.
T.) 160 N. Y. Supp. 609; Klaw v. General Film Co. (1915, Spec. T.) 154
N. Y. Supp. 988, aff'd (1915, 1st Dept) 171 App. Div. 945, 15G N. Y. Supp.
1128. The protection accorded the plaintiff in the instant case seems to
rest solely on the principles of unfair competition.
NAVIGABLE WATERS-LANDS UNDER NAVIGABLE WATERS BELONG TO STATT
-Prior to the admission of the territory of Minnesota as a state, the
United States had granted certain lands therein to the Indians. This
area included a navigable lake. After the admission of Minnesota as a
State, the Indians ceded these lands to the United States, to be sold for
their benefit. Later, Minnesota drained the lake, and relinquished her
rights to the riparian owners. The United States brought a bill in equity
to quiet title to the bed of the lake, claiming under the grant from the
Indians. The bill was dismissed. Held, that the order be affirmed, since
the title to the lands under the lake, not having been granted to the Indians,
passed to Minnesota upon its becoming a State. United Statcs S. Holt
State, Bank (1925, Oct. Term.) 46 Sup. Ct. 197.
This decision accords with the general doctrine that title to the beds
of navigable waters held by the United States vests in the state upon its
admission to the Union. Pollard v. Hagan (1845, U. S.) 3 How. 212; see
Shively v. Bowiby (1394) 152 U. S. 1, 26, 14 Sup. Ct 548, 558. Of
course this does not exclude the power of the United States to take such
lands without compensation for the improvement of navigation. Lcvwis
Blue Point Oyster Co. v. Briggs (1913) 229 U. S. 82, 33 Sup. Ct. 679.
Title to such lands is given to the state in order to put newly admitted
states on an equal basis with the original thirteen. See Pollard v. Hagan,
supra, at 229; Oklahoma v. Texas (1922) 258 U. S. 574, 583, 42 Sup. Ct
406, 410. The latter are said to hold such title as successors to the rights
of the Crown. See Stevenson, Title of Land Under Water in New York
(1914) 23 YALE LAW JotuRNAL, 397; 1 Farnmn, Waters and Water Rights
(1904) 178. Hence, after admission of a state, a conveyance by the United
States of lands within the state bordering on navigable waters does not
of itself convey any title beyond highwater mark. Shively -e. Bowiby,
supra; see Hardin v. Shedd (1903) 190 U. S. 503, 509, 23 Sup. Ct 635.
Whatever title to submerged land the grantee acquires in such case is
derived from the state rather than from the federal government. Pacher
v. Bird (1891) 137 U. S. 661, 11 Sup. Ct. 210; see Hallam, Rights in Soil
and Minerals Under Water (1917) 1 MINN. L. REV. 34, 37. In some states,
private ownership extends only to high water mark. Mears Slayton Bldg.
Material Co. v. Boynton (1924) 233 Ill. App. 256 (Lake Michigan); see
Van Siclen, v. Muir (1907) 46 Wash. 38, 42, 89 Pac. 188, 189. Whereas in
others it extends to the low water mark. Town, of Orange v. Remnih (1920)
94 Conn. 573, 109 Atl, 864 (Long Island Sound); cf. State v. City of Tamps
'1924, Fla.) 102 So. 336 (statute divesting state of all property rights in
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all submerged lands upheld). Or to the mid-channel of a navigable stream.
Goff v. Cougle (1898) 118 Mich. 307, 76 N. W. 489; of. Cross v. Berlin
Mills Co. (1918) 79 N. H. 116, 105 Atl. 411.
PARENT AND CHILD-REVOCATION OF ADOPTION-PWER OF STATE TO CUT
OFF EXPECTANCY OF INHERITANCE.-The contestants of the testator's will
claim as his heirs through their mother, now deceased, whom the testator
adopted by a special act of the legislature in 1863. This adoption was
expressly revoked by another special act in 1874. The probate court found
that the contestants were not heirs of the testator. From an order deny-
ing a new trial of that issue, the contestants appealed. Held, that the
order be affirmed. In re Hack's Estate (1926, Minn.) 207 N. W. 17.
Adoption is a creature of statute, unknown to the common law. Wood-
ward's Appeal (1908) 81 Conn. 152, 70 Atl. 453; Peck, Domestic Relations
(1913) 246. Prior to statutes enabling qdoption, it was possible only by
special act of the legislature, as in the instant case. The result of adop-
tion, however effected, is the creation of a status, that of parent and
child, and not a contractual obligation. In this respect it is similar to
marriage. Matter of Ziegler (1913, Surro.) 82 Misc. 346, 143 N. Y. Supp,
562 (holding adoption a status); Maynard v. Hill (1888) 125 U. S. 190,
8 Sup. Ct. 723 (holding marriage a status); Peck, op. cit. 251. Many
states have statutes expressly permitting revocation or abrogation of
adoption for cause shown or by consent of all the parties, i. o., natural
parents, foster parents and the child, if the latter is over a certain age.
E.g., Minn. Gen. Sts. 1923, ch. 73, sec. 8631; N. Y. Cons. Laws, 1923, ch. 14,
sec. 116-118. Such statutes have been upheld. Buttrey v. West (1924)
212 Ala. 321, 102 So. 456; Matter of Ziegler, supra. And since divorce
may be validly granted by special act of the legislature the same power
may fairly be supposed to exist over adoption, as in the instant case.
Maynard v. Hill, supra; Starr v. Pease (1831) 8 Conn. 541 (divorce granted
by legislature). The right to dower may be extinguished by divorce.
Peck, op. cit. sec. 60. By analogy, revocation of adoption should cut off
the child's expectancy of inheritance. The instant case seems sound in so
holding. Courts have consistently refused to recognize any "vested" in-
terest in an heir's expectancy of inheritance, and have upheld the power
pf the state to alter the inheritance laws. In re Hagar's Estate (1924,
Vt.) 126 Atl. 507; Simpson v. Simpson (1886) 114 Ill. 603, 4 N. E. 137;
Buck v. Kittle's Estate (1877) 49 Vt. 288; Marshall v. King (1852) 24
Miss. 85; of. Nugent v. Smith (1922, 1st Dept.) 202 App. Div. 279, 195
N. Y. Supp. 338. And courts have so little recognized this expectancy that
no cause of action will lie for fraud by third persons causing the testator
to make or change a will. Hall v. Hall (1917) 91 Conn. 514, 100 Atl. 441;
Hutchins v. Hutchins (1845, N. Y.) 7 Hill, 104; but see Lewis v. Corbin
(1907) 195 Mass. 520, 526, 81 N. E. 248, 250; COMMENTS (1917) 27 YALE
LAw JOURNAL, 263. Of expectancies generally see NoTEs (1925) 25 CoL.
L. REV. 215.
PERSONAL PRoPERTY-GIFTs--FoRGIVENSS OF DEBTS-DELVERY OF RE-
CEIPT.-The plaintiff tendered to the defendant's intestate a check in pay-
ment of an instalment due under a contract of purchase of real estate.
The latter -accepted the check as payment for the instalment due, but de-
clared that the plaintiff need not pay the remaining instalments and handed
the check to the plaintiff instructing him to indorse on it "Paid in full on
home on M. Street". Plaintiff made the indorsement and gave back the
check which was cashed. On refusal of defendant tb give a deed to the
property the plaintiff petitioned for an order requiring its execution. The
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lower court decided that the deceased had made a valid gift to the plaintiff
of the unpaid instalments and gave judgment for the plaintiff. Hcld, that
the judgment be affirmed. In re Dohm's Estate (1926, Wis.) 200 N. W. 877.
Ordinarily a liquidated claim cannot be discharged by mere part pay-
ment. Foakes v. Beer (1884) 9 App. Cas. 605. This is so although the
creditor delivers a receipt in full. Galowitz v. Hciidlin (1914, Sup. Ct) 150
N. Y. Supp. 641; 1 Williston, Contracts (1920) Sec. 120. However, where
the discharge is intended as a gratuity and not to induce part payment,
delivery of a receipt discharges the debt. Gray -v. Barton (1873) 55 N. Y. 63;
of. Stewart v. Hidden (1863) 13 Blinn. 43 (gratuitous delivery of note to
maker by holder) ; (1925) 37 A. L. R. 1137, note. Such discharge is described
as a "gift" of the indebtedness. In the case of a gift of a chattel, delivery
is essential under the traditional view. Cochrane v. Moore (1890) 25 Q.
B. D. 57. The suggestion has been made that, while delivery is of impor-
tance as confirming the donative intent, it should no longer be treated as
a sine qua non of a valid gift, and that any act tending to prove the gift
intent should suffice. Norus (1924) 24 COL. L. REV. 767. There is some
support for this view. Matter of Cohn (1919, 1st Dept.) 187 App. Div.
392, 176 N. Y. Supp. 225 (delivery of letter announcing intention to make
gift of bonds); Hillebrand v. Brewer (1851) 6 Tex. 45 (marking cattle
with a brand registered in the name of donee). A gift of a debt may be
made without any delivery by destroying the note evidencing the debt.
Sullivan v. Shea (1916) 32 Calif. App. 369, 162 Pac. 925. This is recog-
nized by statute as a discharge of the note. N. I. L., see. 119. Also in-
dorsement of payment on the instrument of debt by the creditor in the
presence of the debtor may constitute a gift of the debt, if so intended.
Green v. Langdon (1873) 28 Alich. 221 (indorsement on mortgage); In re
Lewis's Estate (1891) 139 Pa. 640, 22 Atl. 635 (indorsement on mortgage
bonds); see Morey v. Wiley (1902) 100 Ill. App. 75, 78; but cf. Heczer v.
Helmer (1924, Ga.) 125 S. E. 849 (debt not discharged when indorse-
ment made without knowledge of the debtor). The indorsement can be
made by the debtor when authorized by the creditor. Albert v,. Albcrt
(1891) 74 21d. 526, 22 Atl. 403 (debtor credited himself on his own books
at direction of creditor); Green e. Langdon, supra (indorsement made by
debtor's wife at direction of creditor). But in the instant case the in-
dorsement was not made on an instrument evidencing the debt forgiven;
and in this respect the decision goes further than the authorities. How-
ever, the donor's indorsement necessary to the cashing of the check might
well be regarded as an acknowledgment of the receipt written on the bac:
(by the donee), and the presentment for payment as a delivery of such
receipt to the bank as agent for the donee. On this interpretation, the
instant case might be brought within the rule of Gray v. Barton, -upra.
SPECIFIC PERFORIIANCE-IUTUAITY=-EXECUTORY CONTRACT HLD NOT
ENFORCEABLE By AN INFANT WHO RATIFIED ATERa BEco,.ING or AGO-
When the plaintiff was nineteen years old, he contracted to purchase land
from the defendant. A provision of the contract made time of the essence.
The plaintiff tendered payments on the agreed dates, but the defendant
refused to convey. The plaintiff's nemt friend brought this suit for specific
performance, and after the beginning of the suit, the plaintiff, becoming
of age, affirmed the contract and continued the action in his own name.
The lower court denied the relief asked. Held, on appeal, that the judg-
ment be affirmed on the ground that the remedy was not mutual when the
contract was made, and, since time was of the essence, specific perform-
ance could not be granted after the infant had attained his majority.
Bracy v. Miller (1926, Ark.) 278 S. W. 41.
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Specific performance of a purely executory contract is usually denied an
infant because the remedy is not mutual. Flight v. Bolland (1828) 4 Russ.
Ch. 298; Freeman v. Fishman (1923) 245 Mass. 222, 139 N. E. 846; Pom
eroy, Specific Performance of Contracts (3d ed. 1926) see. 164. The rule
is justified as being necessary to protect the other party from loss through
possible repudiation by the infant. NOTES (1926) 26 COL. L. REv. 336, 338.
Specific performance is, of course, decreed where the contract was made
for the infant by his guardian. Guy v. Hansow (1912) 86 Kan. 933, 122
Pac. 879. For then the remedy is mutual when the contract is made.
Smith v. Smith (1867) 36 Ga. 184. But an infant himself may enforce
the contract where he has fully performed personal services as considera-'
tion. Asberry v. Mitchell (1917) 121 Va. 276, 93 S. E. 638. Similarly
the remedy has been granted where the infant was in possession and made
valuable improvements. Seaton a. Tohill (1898) 11 Colo. App. 211, 53
Pac. 170. In these cases the courts based their decisions on the ground
that the enforcement of the contract would be beneficial to the infant.
See Asberry v. Mitchell, supra, at 282, 93 S. E. at 640; see also Seaton v,
Tohill, supra, at 215, 53 Pac. at 171. It seems, however, that once the
remedy is granted, the infant cannot thereafter disaffirm. See Asberry v.
Mitchell, supra, at 283, 93 S. E. at 640. That being so, the infant's mn-
ority would seem to be no reason for refusing the remedy generally in
cases of executory contracts, deemed by the court to be beneficial to the
infant. Yet, according to Fry's rule, the mutuality must have existed at
the inception of the contract. Fry, Specific Performance of Contracts
(6th ed. 1921) sec. 460. Nevertheless, it has been said that an infant may
secure specific performance by affirming the contract when he becomes of
age. See Solt v. Anderson (1902) 63 Nebr. 734, 737, 89 N. W. 306, 308;
Ames, Lectures on Legal History (1913) 374; Stone, Mutuality Rule in
New York (1916) 16 CoL. L. REv. 443, 446. This was early recognized
where the infant was in possession of the land. Clayton v. Ashdown
(1715) 9 Vin. Abr. 393. And dn the whole, this policy seems in keeping
with the better view of mutuality, that "the decree if rendered, will oper-
ate without injustice or oppression either to the plaintiff or to the defend-
ant". See Justice Cardozo, in Epstein v. Gluckin (1922) 233 N. Y. 490,
494, 135 N. E. 861, 862. But the court in the present case found that in
view of the fact that time was of the essence, it would be inequitable to
enforce the contract at this late date. The infant is therefore confronted
with a dilemma, which might well be solved by a more liberal view of
mutuality in infants' contracts.
TORTS-BRoKER--FRAuDULENT INTERFERENCE WITH PROSPECTIVE CON-
TACT.-The plaintiff, a real estate broker, procured one O'Brien as pur-
chaser at terms satisfactory to the vendor. O'Brien, however, refused to
sign a written contract because a second broker, having learned of the
plaintiff's negotiations, induced O'Brien to permit him to make a lower
offer to the owner in the name of a third person. The owner accepted the
latter offer in reliance upon the defendant's fraudulent statement that he
was not representing O'Brien. The third party assigned his contract to
O'Brien the next day. The plaintiff sued the owner, second broker, and
purchaser. Judgment was given against all but the owner, and the other de-
fendants appealed. Held, that the judgment be affirmed on the ground that
the defendants had fraudulently interfered with the plaintiff's business.
Skene v. Carayanis (1926) 103 Conn. 708, 131 Atl. 497.
A party to a contract has a cause of action against one who knowingly
induces the other party to break the contract. Lumley v. Gyc (1853,
Q. B.) 2 El. & BI. 216; Angle v. Chicago etc. Ry. (1895) 151 U. S. 1, 14
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Sup. Ct. 240. It is immaterial that such contract is unenforceable becauze
not in writing as required by the Statute of Frauds. Benton v. Pratt
(1827, N. Y.) 2 Wend. 385; Cumabcrland Glass Mfg. Co. v. DoWitt (1013)
120 Md. 381, 87 Atl. 927; Rice v. Manley (1876) 66 N. Y. 82. Even where
there is no contract, intentional interference with another's buzinezz is
actionable unless privileged. Competition ordinarily constitutes a sufficient
justification for resulting harm, but if the interference is brought about
by fraud, or intimidation this defense is not available. See Mogul S. S.
Co. v. McGregor (1889) L. R. 23 Ch. Div. 598, 614. This rule has been gener-
ally followed. Dunshee v. Standard Oil Co. (1911) 152 Iowa, 018, 132 N. W.
371; Hutton v. Watters (1915) 132 Tenn. 527, 179 S. W. 134. The opposite
result is reached where the element of fraud is absent. See Ashley ct
aL. v. Dixon (1872) 48 N. Y. 430, 432. Actual damage must, however, be
shown in a tort action for fraud. See Bowcu v. HaUl (1881) 6 Q. B. D. 333,
337. And an agent who is the procuring cause of a sale made by the owner,
or a second broker, may recover his conmdssion from the vendor. Rcy-
nolds v. Tompkins (1883) 23 W. Va. 229; HoadIcy v. Sav-igs Banl; of
Danbury (1899) 71 Conn. 599, 42 Atl. 667. So it might be urged that the
plaintiff suffered no damage. The plaintiff has lost the advertisement inci-
dental to the sale, however. .Also, were she to sue for commission, she
-would undoubtedly incur the ill will of the owner and thus loZe the expec-
tancy of his business. Hence the instant case seems sound since the defend-
ant's fraudulent conduct has caused loss other than that of commission.
